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The indictment of military officers accused in six disappearance cases has set off a national debate
on who is to blame for the human rights violations committed by the military in the 1980s. Since
the charges were made public in July, the military has conducted occasional tank maneuvers in
the streets of the capital, prompting speculation that the military might resist submission to a
civilian court. Meanwhile, the defense shaping up for the accused officers rests upon the needs
of national security and claims that their actions are covered by amnesty decrees. On July 25, the
attorney general brought charges of attempted murder and illegal detention against 10 current
and former military officers holding rank as high as general. The charges are related to the 1982
"temporary disappearance" of six university students who survived their abduction and were
eventfully released (see NotiSur, 08/04/95).
Spearheading the unprecedented effort to try high-ranking officers in human rights cases are
Attorney General Edmundo Orellana and government human rights ombudsman Leo Valladares.
Orellana is simultaneously pursuing the human rights charges against the military officers and
corruption charges against former president Rafael Callejas (1990-1994) and several of his former
cabinet members. These actions are part of the "moral revolution" aimed at ending official
corruption and impunity, which has been the theme of President Roberto Reina's administration
(see NotiSur, 06/02/95 and 06/16/95).
At least one suit is being contemplated against Orellana, claiming that his appointment was
unconstitutional, and there is discussion in the legislature about modifying the attorney general's
functions. Orellana has hinted that the president is losing interest in the moral revolution. Still,
Reina has made many public statements consistently supporting the indictments. He said that any
officer guilty of human rights abuses should publicly ask for forgiveness but also should submit to
the judgement of the courts. But shortly after the formal charges were made against the officers,
Reina said he would consult with the other branches of government on possible changes in the
administration of justice.
The suggestion that Orellana's authority might be trimmed through negotiations with the legislature
prompted the attorney general to say, "You don't negotiate justice...it has to be the courts that hand
down the sentences." The justice system used to be only for "chicken thieves," said Orellana. But
now "when it touches the elites, everyone is shocked." The background for the accusations against
the officers is a 1993 report by Valladares, which documented disappearances and other human
rights violations committed by the military. The report linked the violations to government anti-
insurgency tactics used against suspected guerrillas and leftists. The military justified its actions
in the "dirty war" of the 1980s by invoking the national security doctrine developed as a defense
against international communism (see NotiSur, 06/01/95).
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At the outset, the military's official institutional reaction to the criminal charges hinted at
uncertainty in the high command about how to respond. Rumors flew in the capital that the military
had ordered the accused officers not to submit to a trial. As the Armed Forces Council (Consejo
Superior de las Fuerzas Armadas) met on Aug. 2 to discuss the matter, tanks were sent into the
streets. Later, armed forces chief Gen. Luis Alonso Discua told the press that the deployment of
tanks was not related to the case. He promised that the military would respect the authority of the
courts. The constitutional order would be observed, he said, and the military would confine its
defense of the accused within the framework of the law. At the same time, however, he warned
against the judicial system taking "vengeance" and using the military as "scapegoats" for the abuses
of the past. He also issued a veiled threat of retaliation if the courts do not act "fairly."
"The armed forces will take action if there is any problem of partiality in the courts," said Discua.
Discua's remarks previewed the legal and political defense that has been developed through
a public relations campaign carried out in newspaper announcements, press conferences, and
statements via the military's official television program Proyecciones Militares. The disappearances
took place, said Discua, "during a war against the left, whose members planted bombs, assaulted
banks, and kidnapped, yet no one is judging them." Discua accused judge Roy Medina, who
is hearing the case, of being partial to "a certain group." By this, Discua meant government
prosecutors, who the military says were once "leftists" and are now seeking revenge on the military
for events of the 1980s.
Armed forces spokesman Guillermo Pagan spelled out the main line of defense for the accused. On
the television program Proyecciones Militares, Pagan argued that the 1991 amnesty decree, which
covered political crimes, should apply as much to the military as it does to the former insurgents.
"If the acts committed by those who were attacking the democratic system are considered political
crimes...then the acts committed by the authorities against subversives should also be considered
political crimes," said Pagan.
Furthermore, Pagan denied the president's assertion that the courts should decide whether the
amnesty decree applies to the military. Pagan insisted it automatically applies. By asserting that
the amnesty decree makes a trial unnecessary (one military spokesperson said that Orellana was
"wasting his time"), the debate turned away from the question of guilt or innocence. Indeed, the
defense strategy shifted from initial claims that all military officers were innocent until proven guilty
in a court of law to one of offering to admit their quilt to qualify them for amnesty.
Human rights groups are divided on the issue of the military's eligibility for amnesty. Ramon
Custodio, president of the Comite para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos (CODEH), said there
was little chance the officers would ever come to trial. "The [amnesty] decree as written definitely
covers the military officers," he said, even though the decree "violates all constitutional norms," and
should be declared unconstitutional. "The interesting thing is that the military implicitly recognized
that it committed these crimes....They asked for amnesty because they feel guilty and want to be
pardoned and have their actions forgotten," he said. But other human rights groups as well as
human rights ombudsman Valladares argue that amnesty only applies to crimes against the state,
not to human rights violations committed by the state. "We are as ignorant about the law as is
Doctor Custodio," said Berta Oliva of the Comite de Familiares de Detenidos Desaparecidos en
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Honduras (COFADEH), an organization of families of victims, "but I insist that amnesty does not
extend to the military."
Beyond the amnesty issue is the broader question of who is to blame for the anti-insurgency tactics
that led to the 184 disappearances that have been recorded for the 1980s. The question is creating
acrimonious debate and finger-pointing in Honduran political circles. President Reina's "moral
revolution" and Orellana's crusade against official impunity appear to have unleashed a national
movement of self- examination. Armed forces chief Discua and army chief Mario Hung blame
government officials. It is they, not the military, said Hung, who should ask for forgiveness for the
disappeared persons because the anti-insurgency operations were carried out under government
policy.
The government should build a monument to the victims, he said, and then forget about them so
that the country can come together. "We acted only in fulfilling our duty, following the orders of
our superiors," said retired Gen. Daniel Bali, who was military chief in the 1980s. "And one of those
[superiors] was former president [Roberto] Suazo [1982-1985]." Military leaders in the 1980s, he said,
were merely the "subordinates" who received orders from the National Security Council (Consejo
Nacional de Seguridad).
As attention turned to current and former government officials, Jorge Madariaga, a member of the
governing Partido Liberal, said the president of the legislature, Carlos Flores Facusse, should testify
about the disappearances because he was a member of the Consejo Nacional de Seguridad in the
1980s. But several former government officials say they were powerless to control the military during
that decade, and that the policy of torture and murder of political dissidents was forced on them by
the US during the Cold War. Former presidents Suazo and Jose Azcona (1986-1989) have said that
the power rested with the military, not with them.
"The president had his hands tied when it came to intervening in the internal affairs of the armed
forces," said Azcona. "This is an ornamental job," said Suazo, referring to the presidency. Perhaps
the most straightforward statement of what happened during the 1980s came from Carlos Montoya,
now the Honduran ambassador to Nicaragua, who was president of the legislature in the years
1986-1990. His view is essentially that there was no observance of the constitutional division of
governmental powers and that Honduran sovereignty all but disappeared under the weight of US
Cold-War policy in Central America.
During the 1980s, he said, Honduras had "an institutional policy of selective assassination that led to
the forced disappearance of opposition politicians." This policy came from the US and was carried
out by local "puppets," both civilian and military, said Montoya. Montoya's view is that the dirty
war was a grave error and a degradation of Honduran honor. The solution to the present dilemma
is to point out the guilty, pardon them, and pay compensation to the families of the victims, said
Montoya. "The truth must be told," he said. "The real power in Honduras during that time was
the military, led by Gen. [Gustavo] Alvarez Martinez and the security agents of the United States,
particularly the CIA." [Sources: Associated Press, 08/03/95; Inter Press Service, 08/09/95; Notimex,
08/09/95; Inforpress Centroamericana (Guatemala), 08/10/95; Agencia Centroamericana de Noticias
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Spanish News Service, 08/14/95; Agence France-Presse, 08/02/95, 08/09/95, 08/13/95, 08/20/95;
Reuter, 08/03/95, 08/09/95, 08/15/85, 08/23/95]
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